

BERN et al.  
Appl. No. 09/897,896  
November 8, 2005

### REMARKS

Entry of this supplemental amendment, reconsideration, and allowance of the subject application are respectfully requested.

This supplemental amendment has been filed further to the recently-filed RCE and in response to comments made in the advisory action issued by the Examiner. The following comments supplement the distinctions set forth in the amendment after final now entered with the recent RCE.

Based on comments in the advisory action, a fundamental point that the Examiner should understand is that the present claims are *not* directed to the details of how to perform a call interception. Instead, the focus of the claimed invention is on what happens *before* a call interception can take place to make a call interceptable. This is a key distinction from Cox which specifically relates to the details of *how* a call is intercepted and says nothing about how a call is made interceptable.

Claims 1, 26, 27, 35, and 44 have been amended to recite that the call being set up relates to a non-dialable virtual subscription. A non-dialable subscription is a virtual subscription that is capable of placing a call, but which itself cannot be called. An example of a non-dialable virtual subscription is a call service where a subscriber dials a specific access number (such as toll-free number), the service collects specific data for identifying the subscriber in order to authenticate the user, and then the call is placed. This service allows, for example, subscribers of a home telephone network in a home country to place calls in foreign countries, but still have those calls billed on the home subscription.

Consider the situation where a subscriber of a non-dialable virtual subscription service accesses the service from a public phone. Cox would not be able to intercept such a call because

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the public phone (calling number) is not associated with the subscriber for which interception is to be performed. Moreover, the service access number (called number) cannot be used for an interception because it is common to all subscribers of that service in a given country. Instead, an intelligent network (IN) node setting up the call would insert its own data, which again would *not* be associated with the subscriber of the non-dialable virtual subscription. Indeed, the Examiner's own arguments relating to AINs indicate that the invocation of service in an AIN requires the presence of a triggering number in the call data. But for a non-dialable virtual subscription, no such triggering information is present.

In summary, neither Cox nor Benash disclose or suggest how to make a non-dialable virtual subscription interceptable. Cox cannot intercept a call set up in accordance with a non-dialable virtual subscription. Nor is Benash helpful here because the mere existence of a virtual subscription does not give information on its interceptability. In addition, neither Cox nor Benash teach adding user identification information to a call being set up in accordance with a non-dialable virtual subscription. Again, the claims deal with making a call interceptable while Cox is concerned with how to intercept a call that has been made interceptable.


The application is in condition for allowance. An early notice to that effect is earnestly solicited.

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Respectfully submitted,

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